Chapter 8: State and Local Taxation by Hall, Virginia C.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1977 Article 11
1-1-1977
Chapter 8: State and Local Taxation
Virginia C. Hall
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons
Recommended Citation
Hall, Virginia C. (2012) "Chapter 8: State and Local Taxation," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1977, Article 11.
CHAPTER 8 
State and Local Taxation 
VIRGINIA C. HALL* 
§8.1. Introduction. The Survey year was a quiet one in the tax area. 
The most significant legislative development was the consolidation of 
the administrative provisions of all the state taxes' into one new chapter 
of the General Laws. 2 The most significant case decided by the Supreme 
Judicial Court dealt with the validity of the bank excise tax as applied 
to federal savings and loan associations3 and is of somewhat limited 
interest even to most tax practitioners. 
§8.2. Administration of Taxes: Legislation: Passage of Chapter 
62C. The most important tax development during the Survey year was 
the passage of chapter 62C of the General Laws, 1 which consolidates into 
one chapter the provisions dealing with the administration of almost all 
state taxes2 and to a great extent, imposes a uniform method of adminis-
tering all taxes. The following discussion is a summary treatment of 
chapter 62C, touching only a few of its 77 sections; any practitioner with 
a specific question should refer directly to the statute. Provisions of 
chapter 62C of special significance to a particular tax are discussed in 
the section dealing with that tax. 3 
* Virginia C. Hall is an aBBcciate specializing in taxation at the law firm of Ropes and 
Gray, Boston. 
§8.1. 1 Acts of 1976, c. 415. See § 8.2 infra. 
• G.L. c. 62C. 
• First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Boston v. State Tax Commission, 1977 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 895, 363 N.E.2d 474. See § 8.11 infra. 
§8.2. 1 Acts of 1976, c. 415. 
• Local taxes, such as the property tax, are not affected by G.L. c. 62C. Also, certain 
state tax administrative provisions are not affected. Thus, the administrative provisions 
for the property tax are still contained in G.L. c. 59, and certain aspects of Appellate Tax 
Board procedures are still to be found in G.L. cc. 58, 58A and 63. These provisions, as 
well as c. 62C, should be read in conjunction with the provisions as to administrative 
procedure found in G.L. c. 30A. 
• See §§ 8.3-8.12 infra. 
1
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Chapter 62C applies, "so far as pertinent and consistent, "4 to the 
motor vehicle excise tax, the personal income tax, the various excises 
on different types of corporations (including corporations described in 
chapter 121A), the gasoline and other fuel excises, the meals tax, the 
cigarette tax, the deeds tax, the room occupancy tax, the sales and use 
taxes, the inheritance tax, both the old and new estate taxes, the games 
tax, the tax on alcoholic beverages, and the tax on raffles.5 In addition, 
it applies to the withholding of income tax from wages by employers and 
the declaration of estimated tax by corporations.8 
Chapter 62C details the reporting requirements for the taxes listed 
above, covering both tax and information returns.7 For all such returns, 
an extension of the time for filing may be granted "for good cause," 
provided a portion of the tax is paid. 8 For the various corporation excises 
contained in chapter 63 and the excise on chapter 121A corporations, 
50% of the tax must be paid; for all other taxes 80% must be paid.' 
As a general rule, subject to extension by agreement with the tax-
payer, the Commissioner may assess a tax any time within three years 
from the date a return was filed or was due, whichever occurs later.l0 An 
assessment may be appealed to the State Tax Commission (Commis-
sion) within three years from the date of the return (determined without 
regard to any extension of time), two years from the date of assessment, 
or one year from the date of payment whichever occurs last." If the 
Commission refuses to abate the tax, the taxpayer may appeal within 
60 days from the Commission's decision or within six months from the 
time the taxpayer's appeal to the Commission is deeQled denied. 12 The 
taxpayer may further appeal to the Appellate Tax Board or, in some 
cases arising under chapter 65c (the Massachusetts E~tate Tax) to the 
probate court having jurisdiction of the estate.13 Generally if any tax is 
refunded, the refund includes interest at 6%14 and if a tax is not timely 
paid, the taxpayer is charged 8% interest on the outstanding balance. 15 
In addition, if a return is not timely filed a penalty of 1% per month of 
the outstanding tax due up to a maximum of 25%, is imposed. 18 
• G.L. c. 62C, § 2 . 
• ld. 
I Id., § 19. 
7 G.L. c. 62C, §§ 5-18. 
' G.L. c. 62C, § 19. 
I Id. 
II Jd., § 26(b), 
II Id., § 37. 
12 Id., § 39. 
13 Id. 
II Id., § 40. 
II Id., § 33. 
II Id. 
2
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Chapter 62C also deals with the procedure for collecting unpaid taxes 
by levying on the taxpayer's property17 (largely taken from chapter 58), 
and with the procedure for registering vendors and other persons re-
quired to register vendors and other persons required to register by 
chapters 64A through 641.18 
§8.3. Property Tax: Judicial Developments: Exemption from 
Tax for Manufacturing Corporations. This year, as in many past 
years, the property tax was the most fertile field for litigation. The issue 
most frequently raised during the Survey year was whether the taxpayer 
was a manufacturing corporation under section 2 of chapter 58, so as to 
be exempt from local property taxes under section 5 of chapter 59. 1 
The Supreme Judicial Court and the Appellate Tax Board, following 
the time-honored approach of applying the common meaning of the 
term "manufacturing, "2 rejected three novel attempts by taxpayers to 
come within the scope of the exemption. In First Data Corp. v. State 
Tax Commission, 3 the taxpayer, a computer time-sharing business, 
sought to satisfy the statutory requirement by arguing that the conver-
sion of data fed into the computer into new information constituted 
manufacturing. Alternately, the taxpayer argued that the "flow of one 
stream of electrons into the computer, and the flow out of another" 
17 ld., §54. 
18 ld., § 67. 
§8.3. 1 G.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. Sixteenth, ~ (3) exempts from local property tax "all prop-
erty" of a qualified manufacturing corporation except "real estate, poles and underground 
conduits, wires and pipes." 
z See Franki Foundation Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 361 Mass. 614, 281 N.E.2d 865 
(1972); Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation v. Assessors of Boston, 321 Mass. 90, 71 
N .E.2d 874 (1947). In Assessors of Boston the Court posited a definition of manufacturing 
which assumed that the "usual and ordinary meaning," ld. at 97, 71 N.E.2d at 879, was 
intended by the statute and held that manufacturing involved "the process of transform-
ing raw or finished materials by hand or machinery, and through human skill and knowl-
edge, into something possessing a new nature and name and adapted to new use." Id. at 
94, 71 N.E.2d at 877. This "transformation" requirement was echoed in Assessors of 
Boston v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 323 Mass. 730, 740, 84 N.E.2d 129, 136 
(1949), quoting Boston and Maine R.R. v. Billerica, 262 Mass. 439, 444-45, 160 N.E. 419, 
422 (1928), where the Court defined manufacturing to require "application of forces ... 
which result[s] in the transformation of some preexisting substance or element into 
something different . . . . " 
In Franki Foundation Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 361 Mass. 614, 281 N.E.2d 865 (1972), 
this "usual and ordinary" standard was reaffirmed, and used to distinguish 
"construction" from "manufacturing" on the ground that "construction" involved assem-
bly of finished substances whereas manufacturing involved the creation of new substances. 
361 Mass. at 619-620, 281 N .E.2d at 868-69. Thus, the distinction established by the cases 
has restricted the exemption to property used in manufacturing as conventionally under-
stood, requiring changes in the form of structure of a preexisting substance. 
3 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2731, 357 N.E.2d 933. 
3
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constituted such an alteration of the preexisting form into a new form 
as would constitute manufacturing. 4 The taxpayer also argued that as a 
matter of tax policy the computer industry was as worthy of preferential 
tax treatment as were more conventional manufactur~rs.5 The Court 
rejected the taxpayer's position on the ground that" 'manufacturing,' 
according to ordinary acceptation, does not include the transmission or 
manipulation of knowledge or intelligence."• It also rejected the tax-
payer's policy argument calling it "beyond our province. "7 
In Hopkinton LNG Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 8 the taxpayer's 
business was converting natural gas into a liquid and storing it in that 
form, then vaporizing it and distributing it to its customers. In a brief 
opinion the Supreme Judicial Court held, affirming the, Appellate Tax 
Board, that the Board's findings did not require a conclusion that the 
gas had a new nature or use after it had been liquified and vaporized.• 
In The Charles River Mouse Farms, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 10 
a somewhat less credible attempt to qualify as a manufacturing corpora-
tion was made by a breeder and producer of laboratory animals. The 
Appellate Tax Board rejected the notion that the breeding, raising and 
selling of animals that are germ-free or exposed to certain kinds of 
bacteria is manufacturing, holding that to do so woulq put "a forced, 
strained and unnatural construction" on the word manufacturing." 
In addition to cases involving the question whether a particular activ-
ity was manufacturing, the Court decided one case during the Survey 
year involving the question of whether a sufficient portion of the tax-
payer's activities were manufacturing so as to enable it to qualify for the 
exemption. In Fernandes Super Markets, Inc. v. State Tax 
Commission, 12 the taxpayer was a supermarket chain which ran a small 
bakery at each of its stores. The bakery was the taxpay~r's only manu-
facturing activity and accounted for 2.79 percent of the taxpayer's gross 
receipts, and 7.5 percent of its gross profit; and in addition it employed 
12.6 percent of its employees. 13 The Court held that this activity was not 
sufficient to warrant classifying the taxpayer as a manufacturing corpo-
ration, with the resulting exemption of all its equipment from local 
property taxes. While refusing to draw a "strict line" as to what percent 
' I d. at 2734, 357 N .E.2d at 934-35. 
• ld. at 2734, 357 N.E.2d at 935. 
• I d. at 2735, 357 N .E.2d at 935. 
7 /d. at 2736, 357 N .E.2d at 936. 
• 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. 644, 362 N.E.2d 205. 
• I d. at 645, 362 N .E.2d at 205-06. 
11 Docket Nos. 74599, 74600,82037,82038 (1976), reprinted at 2 MA8s. TAx CAS. (CCH) 
, 200-472, at 10,417. · 
11 Id. at 10,419. 
12 1976 M888. Adv. Sh. 2572, 357 N.E.2d 296. 
11 Id. at 2574, 357 N.E.2d at 297. 
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of a taxpayer's activities must be manufacturing in order to qualify for 
the exemption, the Court laid down the general guideline that manufac-
turing must constitute a substantial component of the taxpayer's activi-
ties, although it need not necessarily be its principal business. u It re-
jected the taxpayer's claim that manufacturing need only be something 
more than "trivial" or "incidental," noting that the reason for the ex-
emption was not to confer a windfall on corporations whose activity was 
essentially non-manufacturing.15 
§8,4. Property Tax: Judicial Developments: Other Exemptions. 
United Church of Religious Science v. Board of Assessors of Attleboro1 
involved a claim that property was exempt under G.L. c. 59, § 5, which 
exempts "[p]ersonal property owned by or held in trust within the 
commonwealth for religious organizations, whether or not incorporated, 
if the principal or income is used or appropriated for religious, benevo-
lent or charitable purposes." (Emphasis supplied.) Although the tax-
payer was a religious organization, the property in question, machinery 
used in the manufacture of electrical wire and cable, was not used for 
religious purposes. The income generated by the taxpayer's wire and 
cable business was, however, used for religious purposes, thereby pres-
enting the Court with the question of whether the statute could be 
interpreted, despite its literal language, to deny an exemption to a chari-
table organization for essentially commercial property. 2 
The Appellate Tax Board had rejected the taxpayer's claim without 
really coming to grips with the statutory language.3 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court squarely faced the question whether the statute, despite its 
language, requires both income and principal to be used for religious 
purposes in order to qualify for the exemption. The Court answered 
affirmatively by relying on the "history and purpose" of the exemption.~ 
The Court pointed out that as originally enacted in 1918,5 the exemption 
required that both income and principal be used for religious purposes, 
and that the change in phraseology from "and" to "or" occurred when 
the general laws were codified in 1921. The Court further noted that 
there was no indication at the time of the codification of any intent to 
change the meaning of the exemption and concluded that "the verbal 
change from 'and' to 'or' in the circumstances of these cases did not 
14 Id. 
11 Id. at 2578, 357 N.E.2d at 299. 
§8.4. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 636, 361 N.E.2d 1254. 
z 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 639, 361 N.E.2d at 1256. 
• See United Church of Religious Science v. Board of Assessors of Attleboro, Docket 
Nos. 75003, 75639 (April 7, 1976), summarized at 2 MASS. TAX CAS. (CCH) ~ 200-455, 
discussed in Hall, State and Local Taxation, 1976 ANN. SURv. MASs. LAw§ 7.11, at 244. 
4 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 641, 361 N.E.2d at 1257. 
• Acts of 1918, c. 106, § 1. 
5
Hall: Chapter 8: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
144 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §8.5 
change the meaning of the statute."8 
In DeCenzo v. Board of Assessors of Framingham, 7 an unusual fact 
situation gave rise to the question of the meaning of the word "person" 
in the preamble to section 5 of chapter 59, which provides that "any 
person" who receives an exemption under certain cl~~tuses (including 
clauses twenty-two and thirty-seven) shall not receive an exemption for 
the same property under any other clause. The taxpayer qualified for 
the veterans' exemption under clause twenty-two and his wife qualified 
for the blind persons' exemption under clause thirty-seven. The wife 
received her exemption on property that she and the ta:Xpayer owned as 
tenants by the entirety, but the taxpayer was denied an exemption 
under clause twenty-two for the same property. The Court quite sensi-
bly rejected the assessors' argument that the taxpayer and his wife 
were essentially one person for tax purposes, and held that both exemp-
tions were allowable.8 
The final case dealing with an exemption from the property tax, City 
of Boston v. Mac-Gray Company, Inc., 1 involved the question of whether 
self-service, coin operated washing machines and driers that the tax-
payer had placed in apartment houses pursuant to an agreement with 
the landlords were taxable as "machinery used in the conduct of busi-
ness" or non-taxable as "stock in trade," under clause sixteen (2) of G.L. 
c. 59, § 5. The Court held that the machines were not stock in trade and 
were therefore taxable, since they were not available for sale or lease but 
rather were installed in the buildings under a license ag~eement with the 
owner. The taxpayer's stock in trade, if he had one, was the performance 
of the machines. 10 
§8.5. Property Tax: Judicial Developments: Procedure. In 
Lorantos v. Board of Assessors of Medfield, 1 a rescript opinion, the Su-
preme Judicial Court reaffirmed its decision in Assessors of Saugus v. 
Baumann, 2 to the effect that the Appellate Tax Board has no jurisdic-
tion over appeals under clause eighteen of section 5 (the so-called 
"hardship exemption" for the old, infirm or poor). The Baumann deci-
sion was startling not because of its holding but because of one of the 
rationales given: the Board is not specifically given jurisdiction of such 
appeals.3 Since the Board is specifically given jurisdiction over appeals 
1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 643, 361 N.E.2d at 1257-58. 
7 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 951, 362 N.E.2d 913. 
• ld. at 955, 362 N.E.2d at 915-16. 
1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 206, 359 N.E.2d 946. 
11 ld. at 209, 359 N.E.2d at 948. 
§8.5. ' 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 623, 361 N.E.2d 1253 (rescript). 
' 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 864,345 N.E.2d 360, discussed in Hall, Stat~ and Local Taxation, 
1976 ANN. Suav. MAss. LAw § 7.11, at 242-43. 
3 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 865, 345 N.E.2d at 361. 
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involving only clauses seventeen and twenty-two of section 54 but has 
routinely entertained appeals involving other clauses (which in turn 
have been appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court with no jurisdic-
tional question being raised) the effect of the Baumann decision, if it 
were taken seriously, would be to alter substantially the appellate proce-
dure in property tax matters. 
It appears likely, however, that in spite of the Lorantos decision, the 
Court will confine the scope of Baumann to appeals under clause eight-
een. This view is supported by the fact that the Lorantos decision does 
not repeat the troubling rationale offered in Baumann, and by the fact 
that one day after its decision in Lorantos the Court issued its decision 
in United Church of Religious Science, 6 an appeal from the Appellate 
Tax Board's denial of a property tax exemption under clause ten of 
section 5. Although the Court could have raised a jurisdictional objec-
tion in the latter case under the reasoning of Baumann, it did not. 
Nonetheless, even if the Court does not intend to apply literally the 
jurisdictional limitations on the Appellate Tax Board contained in sec-
tion 6 of chapter 58A, with Baumann it has given those who might wish 
to apply the limitation literally a reminder and a ready tool. 
Two cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court dealt with rela-
tively minor procedural aspects of property tax appeals. In Board of 
Assessors of Salem v. State Tax Commission, 8 the Court held that under 
G.L. c. 58, § 14, a local board of assessors has 10 days from the receipt 
rather than from the mailing of notice of the State Tax Commission's 
valuations of state-owned lands to contest these valuations.7 In Altman 
v. Board of Assessors of Randolph, 8 the Court held that a taxpayer may 
appeal to the Appellate Tax Board under G.L. c. 59, sections 64 and 65 
(as amended through 1973), if the tax at issue is over $1,500 and the 
taxpayer has paid as tax an amount equal to the tax which would be 
due on a valuation equal to the average of the valuation over the pre-
vious three years, 8 despite the fact that the appeal is under the informal 
procedure10 or that during the previous three years an improvement was 
made to the property, substantially increasing its assessed value. The 
Court held that the Appellate Tax Board erred when it dismissed the 
taxpayer's appeal for want of jurisdiction, and that an appeal from the 
Board's decision was proper even though the taxpayer had chosen the 
4 ld. 
' 1977 Mass Adv. Sh. 636, 361 N.E.2d 1254. 
' 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2691, 357 N.E.2d 766. 
7 Id. at 2692, 357 N.E.2d at 767. 
1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 630, 361 N.E.2d 1252. 
• Id. at 631, 361 N.E.2d at 1253. 
to Id. 
7
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informal procedure because the appeal involved a question of law raised 
by the pleadings.11 
§8.6. Property Tax: Legislative Developments. The few changes 
in the property tu statutes during the Survey year donsisted for the 
most part of minor amendments in the procedure for' assessment and 
appeal. A sentence was added to section 59 of chaptet 59, the section 
outlining the procedure for applying for an abatement of tax, which 
makes it clear that one who purchases property during the year may file 
for an abatement of tax on the property for that year, even though the 
tax was assessed to the previous owner.• The time prescribed in section 
75 of chapter 59 for assessing real or personal property omitted from the 
annual assessment was moved back from December 20 to June 20.2 In 
addition, a sentence was added to section 75 providing that valuations 
which were erroneous because of "clerical or data processing errors" 
would be considered omitted assessments for purposes: of the section.3 
Chapter 61A, which permits agricultural and horticultural land to be 
valued for property tax purposes according to such use Upon application 
of the owner to the assessors, was amended so as to enable the owner of 
such property to have the benefit of the special valuation where the city 
or town in which the property lies has undertaken a program of property 
revaluation and the program is not completed in time for the owner to 
meet the usual filing deadline of October 1 on the year preceding that 
for which special valuation is sought. 4 In these cases the filing deadline 
was extended to 30 days following the mailing of the tax bill reflecting 
the new valuation. The application, if approved, was made effective for 
the tax year of the revaluation program.1 
Section 38A of chapter 59, which deals with the valuation of pipelines 
not owned by a gas or electric company, was amended to extend the 
deadline for the State Tax Commission to value such pipelines from 
March 1 to March 15 and similarly to extend the deadline for the owner 
or board of assessors to appeal from these valuations from April 1 to 
April15.• 
§8.7. Personal Income Tax: Legislation. Following the trend of 
past years, conformity of chapter 62 to the federal income tax was taken 
one. step further during the Survey year; section 10 of chapter 62 was 
amended to provide that the income from any portion of a trust which 
11 /d. at 631-32, 361 N.E.2d at 1253. 
§8.6. 1 Acta of 1977, c. 198. 
1 Acts of 1977, c. 166. 
I /d. 
• G.L. c. 61A, § 8, as amended by Acts of 1976, c. 505. 
I /d. 
• Acts of 1977, c. 199. 
8
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is taxable to the grantor for federal tax purposes under the grantor trust 
rules• will likewise be taxable to the grantor rather than to the trust for 
Massachusetts tax purposes.2 1fthe grantor is a nonresident, the trustee 
must withhold the tax on any income which is taxable to a nonresident 
under G.L. c. 62, section 5A. 
The legislature also passed an act3 authorizing the Attorney General, 
on behalf of the residents of Massachusetts, to sue New Hampshire to 
recover payments of the New Hampshire commuter tax, which was held 
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 1975.4 The 
Legislature acted in response to New Hampshire's refusal to abate the 
tax (or years prior to 1975 and the Supreme Court's rejection of a suit 
brought by the Attorney General against New Hampshire to collect the 
approximate amount of the illegally collected tax. 5 The act stipulates 
that one-half of any recovery shall be turned over to the Massachusetts 
residents who paid the tax. 8 
Of the many procedural changes affecting the income tax brought 
about by the passage of chapter 62C, 7 two are worth noting. A general 
requirement is imposed on every individual, corporation, trust, organi-
zation or other entity doing business in the Commonwealth to report the 
names of any residents or other persons to whom it has paid income 
which is taxable under chapter 62 and the amount paid. 8 These reports 
are to be made "on the same basis as is required by the federal govem-
ment."1 
Second, if a taxpayer's federal income tax liability has been adjusted 
in a way so as to increase his Massachusetts tax liability, the taxpayer 
has an affirmative obligation to report and pay any additional Massa-
chusetts tax due within one year of the determination of the change in 
the taxpayer's federal tax liability ,to Under the previous law, the adjust-
ment in the taxpayer's federal tax liability merely triggered a right in 
the Commonwealth to assess additional Massachusetts tax. 11 
§8.7. I I.R.C. §§ 671-78. 
2 G.L. c. 62, § lO(g), as amended by Acts of 1976, c. 510, § 1. 
3 Acts of 1977, c. 102. 
' Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975). 
5 For a further discussion of the developments preceding Acts of 1977, c. 102, see Hall, 
State and Local Taxation, 1976 ANN. SURv. MASs. LAw § 7.3, at 230-31. 
• Acts of 1977, c. 102. 
7 G.L. c. 62C is discussed generally at § 8.2 supra. 
• G.L. c. 62C, § 8, 1st para. This portion of§ 8 replaces the first three paragraphs of 
G.L. c. 62, § 33, which contained information reporting requirements for employers with 
respect to employees, corporations with respect to shareholders and dividends, and corpo-
rations and other entities with respect to recipients of interest payments. Section 33 was 
repealed by Acts of 1976, c. 415, § 100. 
' G.L. c. 62C, § 8, 1st para. 
•o G.L. c. 62C, § 30. 
11 G.L. c. 62, § 37B, prior to repeal by Acts of 1976, c. 415, § 100. 
9
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§8.8. Personal Income Tax: Judicial Developm•nts. One of the 
few cases decided during the Survey year which has rel~vance under the 
current version of chapter 62 is Aubin v. State Tax Commission. 1 There 
the Appellate Tax Board considered whether excess deductions arising 
from the taxpayer's business of owning and operating rental properties 
could be applied against the taxpayer's capital gain from the sale of 
these properties. Under G.L. c. 62, § 2(c)(1) excess deductions against 
"Part B" (5%) income may be taken against "Part A" (10%) income 
only to the extent that the Part A income is "effectively connected with 
the active conduct of a trade or business of the taxpayet." After reciting 
the history of the taxpayer's involvement with the ownership and man-
agement of rental properties, the Board concluded without further dis-' 
cussion that the deductions were allowable. The Boarq did not refer to 
the fact that by treating the gain as Part A income (it.e. as gain from 
the sale of a capital asset), the taxpayer was implicitly taking the posi-
tion that the gain was not from the sale of property held for sale to 
customers in the ordinary course of business.2 In other words, the tax-
payer was taking the position that his business was the rental of proper-
ties, not their sale. It is probably correct that even so tbe sale of proper-
ties is effectively connected with the business of renting them, but the 
proposition is scarcely so obvious as not to warrant any qiscussion at all. 
Druker v. State Tax Commission, 3 another case decided by the Appel-
late Tax Board involved three issues that have been made obsolete by 
changes in the income tax law since Acts of 1971, c. 555, first amended 
G.L. c. 62 so as to transform it into an income tax based on the federal 
income tax.' The Board decided that under G.L. c. 62, as amended 
through Acts of 1971, c. 555, excess deductions against Part B income 
could be taken against Part A income since the intent of the statute, as 
indicated by the Supreme Judicial Court in Barnes v. State Tax 
Commission, 5 was to tax in toto no more than the federal adjusted gross 
income, against which all the deductions at issue were allowable.• Sec-
ond, the Board held that the net operating loss deduction provided by 
section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code could be takert for the purpose 
§8.8. 1 Docket No. 81657 (April22, 1977), reprinted at 2 MASs. TAx. CAS. (CCH) ~ 200· 
489, 10,452. 
• Id. at 10,453. 
• Docket Nos. 73670, 73671 (Feb. 1, 1977), reprinted at 2 MASs. TAX CAS. (CCH) ~ 200-
476. 
• Acts of 1971, c. 555. See Ingraham v. State Tax Comm., 368 Mass. 242, 247, 331 
N .E.2d 795, 797. ' 
1 363 Mass. 589, 296 N.E.2d 510 (1973). 
1 As indicated in the text, G.L. c. 62, § 2(c)(1), as amended by Acts of 1973, c. 723, § 
2, now permits excess deductions against Part B income to be takep. only against that 
portion of Part A income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or 
business. · 
10
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of computing Massachus~tts taxable income again because it was allow-
able for federal tax purposes in computing adjusted gross income7 and 
was nowhere disallowed by G.L. c. 62.8 Finally, the Board held that the 
taxpayer could deduct losses sustained by two trusts from his personal 
income.' The taxpayer was not only the grantor but also the sole trustee 
and beneficiary of one of the trusts and the Board .therefore held that 
as a matter of trust law no trust had in fact been created. The second 
trust was identical to the first trust except that another person had a 
5% beneficial interest. There, the Board found that the beneficiaries had 
sufficient control over the trustee to make the trustee in fact an agent 
for the beneficiaries with respect to the trust property so that again no 
trust was created. 10"fhe Board's opinion in Druker contains dicta indi-
cating that Dexter v. State Tax Commission, 11 holding that losses real-
ized by a revocable trust may not be offset against gains on the grantor's 
personal return, may not be good law since the 1971 changes to chapter 
62. This rather provocative suggestion may be followed up by the Board 
or by the Supreme Judicial Court in other. cases involving pre-1976 tax 
years, but it has been made moot for years later than 1975 Acts of 1976, 
c. 510, which conforms Massachusetts law to the grantor trust provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code (sections 671-678),12 
§8.9. Estate and Inheritance Taxes: Legislation. During the 
Survey year several changes were made in the estate tax law• in order 
to make it work more fairly for both the Commonwealth and the tax-
payer. 
The estate tax as originally passed imposed a tax on all Massachu-
setts real and tangible personal property of nonresidents, but allowed 
the nonresident only an allocable portion of the deductions and exemp-
tions to which a resident would be entitled.2 This method of computa-
tion was changed in 1976; the tax is now determined as if the decedent 
were a Massachusetts resident, then multiplied by the ratio of the non-
resident Massachusetts gross estate (i.e. real estate, and tangible per-
sonal property located in Massachusetts) to what the Massachusetts 
gross estate would have been had the decedent been a Massachusetts 
resident.3 
1 I.R.C. § 62(1). 
• 2 MAss. TAX CAs. (CCH) ~ 200-476, at 10, 825. 
• Id. at 10,427. 
10 Id. at 10,426. 
11 350 Mass. 380, 215 N.E.2d 94 (1966). 
" G.L. c. 62, § 10(g), as amended by Acts of 1976, c. 510. See § 8.7 supra. 
§8.9. 1 G.L. c. 65C, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 74. 
• G.L. c. 65C, § 4, as enacted by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 74. 
3 G.L. c. 65C, § 4, as amended by Acts of 1976, c. 415, § 90, provides in part: 
The tax imposed . . . shall be an amount which bears the same ratio to the tax 
11
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The estate tax was changed to assure that Massachusetts always re-
ceived at least the maximum federal credit allowed for state death taxes 
where the Massachusetts taxable estate was reduced by the exclusion 
of power of appointment property with respect to which future interest 
taxes had previously been settled. 4 This change was effected by adding 
to section 2(b) of chapter 65C a sentence providing that for purposes of 
determining the maximum federal credit the Massacliusetts taxable 
estate would include such power of appointment property. 5 
In order to facilitate the settlement of future interest taxes on pre-
1976 estates, G.L. c. 65 was amended to confer authority on any execu-
tor, administrator or trustee to settle future interest taxes unless the will 
or trust instrument provides to the contrary.• The executor is also given 
authority to make transfers from principal to income wnere settlement 
of the tax is inequitable to the income beneficiary. 7 
The final substantive changes in the death tax statutes were in the 
apportionment statute, G.L. c. 65A, § 5, which allocates federal and 
state estate taxes on probate and non-probate assets in accordance with 
the ratio of such assets to the "net estate." When the ;estate tax was 
originally passed, the definition of "net estate," for purposes of appor-
tioning the c. 65C tax only, was changed to the definition of net estate 
contained in that chapter8 -i.e. the Massachusetts gross estate less 
funeral expenses, claims, and debts with respect to property included 
in the estate.' For other taxes the original definition of 'net estate (the 
federal gross estate less applicable deductions other than specific ex-
emptions) was retained. Since there was no apparent reason for appor-
tionment to operate differently depending on what tax was being appor-
tioned, the definition of net estate was returned to substantially its 
original form in 1976.10 Also during the Survey year, a provision was 
added, effective July 1, 1978, for decedents dying after January 1, 1978, 
that would be due if the decedent had been a resident as (i) the value of all real 
and tangible personal property having an actual situs in Massachusetts, the trans-
fer of which is subject to tax under subsection (a) bears to (ii) the value of the 
decedent's Massachusetts gross estate determined as if he had been a resident. 
• Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 83 excludes from the Massachusetts taxable estate property 
subject to a power of appointment to the extent that future interest taxes on the property 
have previously been paid under G.L. c. 65, § 14. 
• G.L. c 65C, § 2(b), as amended by Acts of 1976, c. 415, § 89. 
• G.L. c. 65, § 15A, as amended by Acts of 1977, c. 179. 
7 G.L. c. 65, § 15A. The Special Settlement Project initiated by the Estate Tax Bureau 
for the period from July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1977 expired without being extended. Settle-
ment may now be made only under the pre-existing rules and at the rates applicable as 
of the decedent's death. 
8 See G.L .. c. 65C, § 1(g). 
• G.L. c. 65A, § 5, as enacted by Acts of 1927, c. 178, § 1. 
10 G.L. c. 65A, § 5, as amended by Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 73. 
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permitting apportionment of interest and penalties other than as pro-
vided in the statute, if a court determines that the statutory formula is 
inequitable. 11 
The changes in the taxation of nonresidents, in the measurement of 
the maximum federal credit for state death taxes, and in the definition 
of "net estate" were intended as corrective changes in the original estate 
tax law. Accordingly, as originally submitted to the legislature, these 
changes were to be retroactive to January 1, 1976. However, as passed 
the changes are not effective until January 1, 1977.12 This change in the 
effective date was apparently accidental and bills to change it have been 
submitted to the legislature. 13 In the meantime the Estate Tax Bureau 
has indicated it will apply the amendments in question retroactively.•• 
§8.10. Estate and Inheritance Taxes: Judicial Developments: 
Election of Itemized Deductions under § 27 of G.L. c. 65. Perry v. 
Commr. of Corporations & Taxation, 1 decided by the Appeals Court, 
involved the requirement in c. 65 that an executor who qualifies for the 
standard deduction make an election if he wishes instead to itemize the 
deductible debts and administration expenses of the estate for inheri-
tance tax purposes.2 The issue before the court was what estates qualify 
for the standard deduction, which in turn required an interpretation of 
the statutory language that the standard deduction shall be allowed "for 
aggregate values subject to taxation under this chapter of less than 
$100,000." The commissioner claimed that this phrase referred to es-
tates with a probate value of less than $100,000, whereas the appellant, 
an executor who had not elected to itemize deductions but who wished 
to claim them, took the position that the phrase referred only to estates 
11 G.L. c. 65A, § 5(5), as added by Acts of 1976, c. 515, § 1. 
12 Acts of 1976, c. 515, §§ 32, 35. 
11 House Bill 272, House No. 4570. See THE TAXATION or EsTATES IN MASSACHUSETI'S 
(MCLE/NELI) (1977). 
14 A gaffe which is on its face far more sweeping was also made in the effective date of 
G.L. c. (l5C itself. As originally passed, the third sentence of Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 97, 
contained the effective date of G.L. c. 65C specifically, that sentence provided that c. 65 
would apply to decedents dying on or after January 1, 1976. The fourth sentence of § 97 
specified that G.L. c. 65 would remain applicable to decedents dying prior to January 1, 
1976 (except for certain future interests in property subject to powers of appointment 
which would not be subject to c. 65). Acts of 1976, c. 415, § 97 amends Acts of 1975, c. 
684, § 97 by striking out the third sentence and replacing it with a sentence substantially 
identical to the fourth sentence of Acts of 1975, c. 684, § 97, with the added proviso that 
c. 65A shall remain in effect with respect to such (pre 1976) estates. The result is that 
there was no statement of the effective date of c. 65C. This result was, of course, uninten-
tional. Legislation to restore the effective date of c. 65C was passed producing the desired 
effective dates. Acts of 1977, c. 76. 
§8.10 1 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 253, 360 N.E.2d 654 (rescript). 
2 G.L. c. 65, § 27. 
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with a gross value of less than $100,000. The Commissioner relied on 
previous announcements by his department supporting his position that 
only probate assets were included, but the court pointed out that con-
current announcements by the Commissioner also supported the appel-
lant's position. In view of this conflict in the Commissioner's published 
positions, the court gave them little weight and rested its decision in-
stead on the basic principle that "ambiguities in tax statutes are to be 
resolved in favor of the taxpayer."3 Resort to this principle should not 
have been necessary; the phrase "aggregate values subject to taxation 
under this chapter" on its face includes the entire gross estate subject 
to tax, not merely the probate estate. 
§8.11. Bank Excise Tax: Judicial Developments. The challenge 
by federal savings and loan associations located in Massachusetts to the 
income-based measure of the Massachusetts bank excise tax,t which 
was initiated at the time that measure was added to the law in 1966,2 
was rmally resolved during the Survey year.3 In First Federal Savings 
and Loan Association of Boston v. State Tax Commission., 4 a declaratory 
action brought by all Massachusetts based federal s~vings and loan 
associations, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the validity of the tax. 
The associations raised objections under federal law and the federal 
and Massachusetts Constitutions to the income measure of the tax in 
its entirety and to the method of calculating income. 
First, the associations claimed that if the tax was valid, they should 
be permitted to deduct interest or dividends paid to members as an 
1 1977 MaBS. Apt. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 253-54, 360 N.E.2d at 655. 
§8.11 1 G.L. c. 63, § ll(a), (b). 
2 Acts of 1966, c. 14, § 11. 
1 An action by the United States in the Federal District Court for Massachusetts, 
claiming that the portion of the excise based on deposits, as applied to federal savings 
and loan associations, was in violation of federal law, had previously been successful. 
United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 348 F. Supp. 397 (D. Mass. 1972), modified on other 
grounds 481 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1973). In that case, several associations intervened and 
raised some of the same objections to the income measure of the tax which were later 
raised before the Supreme Judicial Court. The federal district court rejected those objec-
tions to the income measure which it decided on the merits, 348 F. Supp. at 400; the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that none of the objections should have been 
decided on the merits because the aBSociation had an adequate remedy in the state courts, 
481 F.2d at 973. 
' 1977 MaBS. Adv. Sh. 895, 363 N.E.2d 474. 
1 Most of the appellants had previously filed applications for abatement of the tax, 
beginning in 1966, and had appealed the denial of such applications to the Appellate Tax 
Board. These appeals were pending at the time the declaratory jufigment action was 
brought. All the parties agreed, however, that the action for declar$tory judgment was 
appropriate despite the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 1~77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 899, 363 N.E.2d at 478. See Sydney v. CommiBSioner of Corps. & T'-xation, 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 2538, 356 N.E.2d 460. 
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"operating expense. "• The Court determined that such payments more 
closely resembled dividends than interest and that dividends are not 
usually considered operating expenses. 7 Even though the court consid-
ered the payments analogous to dividends it acknowledged that there 
was some ambiguity in the statute as to whether they were also 
"operating expenses," but resolved this ambiguity in favor of the Com-
missioner's consistent, public position that operating expenses do not 
include "amounts paid or accrued to depositor:., savers or members."8 
The associations claimed that the tax was a tax on gross receipts and 
as such was not authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 1464(h), which permits a state 
to impose a tax "on such [federal savings and loan] associations or 
their franchise, capital reserves, surplus, loans or income . . . . "• The 
Court disagreed, holding that the tax was in the nature of a franchise 
tax which is permitted by § 1461(h).I0 Permitting as it did deductions 
from gross income for additions to the guaranty fund or surplus required 
by federal or state authorities11 did not change the nature of the tax from 
a franchise tax.12 Even if the tax were considered an income tax, it was 
permissible as a tax on "net operating income" and not impermissible 
as a tax on gross income. 13 
The associations also claimed that the tax as applied to them was 
greater than that imposed on similar state institutions, in violation of 
12 U.S.C. § 1464(h) because the additions to reserves required by federal 
authorities were generally less than the comparable additions required 
of state institutions by state authorities, thus giving the federal associa-
tions a smaller deduction than that given to state institutions. 14 The 
Court held that the tax in conjunction with the difference in federal and 
state reserve requirements had not been shown to create a substantial 
competitive disadvantage for federal associations, and that whatever 
difference there might be was not created by the tax but was "inherent 
in the pattern of the federallegislation."16 The Court also rejected the 
1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 900, 363 N.E.2d at 478. 
7 /d. at 901-02, 363 N.E.2d at 479. 
8 /d. at 903-04, 363 N.E.2d at 480. 
1 As federal instrumentalities, federal savings and loan associations are immune from 
state taxation under the Supremacy Clause except to the extent provided otherwise by 
Congress. United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 481 F.2d 963, 969 (1st Cir. 1973). Thus if 
the Massachusetts bank excise tax did not comply· with 12 U.S.C. § 1464(h) (1976), it 
could not be imposed on the associations. 
1e 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 904-05, 363 N.E.2d at 481. The Court noted, however, that it 
should not be understood as implying that a nondiscriminatory tax on gross receipts was 
not permitted by § 1464(h). ld. at 905 n.7, 363 N.E.2d at 481 n.7. · 
II G.L. c. 63, § 11. 
12 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 906, 363 N.E.2d at 481. 
11 /d. at 905, 363 N .E.2d at 481. 
14 Id. at 908, 363 N.E.2d at 482. 
II /d. 
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claim that the tax violated section 1464(h) because credit unions were 
not subject to it, holding that credit unions were not "si~ilar" to federal 
savings and loan associations within the meaning of section 1464(h).•• 
The Court summarily rejected the associations' clai~s that the tax 
was in violation of the commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution; that the tax was an \Jnconstitutional 
delegation of legislative powers in violation of Articles 23 and 30 of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution; and that the 
tax was not "at a uniform rate . . . upon incomes derived from the same 
class of property," in violation of Article 44 of the Amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution.17 
§8.1~ Sales and Use Taxes: Judicial Develop~ents. Most of 
the litigation involving the sales and use tax revolved, predictably 
enough, around the exemptions contained in Section 6 iof Chapter 64H. 
The Supreme Judicial Court faced two cases involvin* the all but in-
comprehensible exemptions for certain machinery, materials, tools and 
fuel contained in Section 6(r) and (s) of Chapter 64H.1 'the first of these 
cases, Ace Heating Service v. State Tax Commission, 2 was a claim by 
heating contractors for exemption of "machinery, ma~rials and sup-
plies" used in the performance of lump-sum contracts' for the sale, in-
stallation and service of hot water and steam generating boilers and 
related equipment. The Court acknowedged the "uncertain scope" of 
the exemptions, 1 but did nothing tO illuminate this mur~y area. In hold-
ing that the exemptions were not applicable, the Court Jave great defer-
ence to "contemporary administrative construction"• apd relied prima-
rily on the CommiBBioner's Emergency Regulations No. 12 which flatly 
states: 
11 Id. at 909, 363 N .E.2d at 482. 
17 ld. at 910-11, 363 N.E.2d at 482-83. 
§8.12 1 Section 6(r) exempts: 
Sales of materials, tools and fuel, or any substitute therefor, which become an 
ingredient or component part of tangible personal property to be sold or which are 
consumed and used directly and exclUBively in agricultural production; in commer-
cial f11hing; in an industrial plant in the actual manufacture of ~ngible personal 
property to be sold, including the publiahing of a newspaper; in the operation of 
commercial radio broadcaating or television transmiuion; in the furnishing of 
power to an industrial manufacturing plant; in the furnishing of gas, water, steam 
or electricity when delivered to consumers through mains, linea or pipes. 
The tirat sentence of I 6(s) is aubstantially i4entical except tru,t it covers sales of 
"machinery or replacement part&" rather than "materials, tools and!fuel." The rest of§ 
6(s) consists of an elaboration on the meaning of various terms used~ the rmt sentence. 
1 1976 M811. Adv. Sh. 2490, 356 N.E.2d 698. · 
1 I d. at 2492, 356 N .E.2d at 699. 
•Jd. 
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Contractors are the consumers of . . . machinery . . which they 
use in their business. The sale or rental of such property to contrac-
tors is subject to the sales and use tax. 5 
It did not discuss the consistency of the regulation with the statute and 
the portion of the opinion where the Court itself examines the taxpayer's 
right to the exemption is weak. First, the Court stated that the property 
in question does not constitute "materials, tools or fuel," within the 
meaning of Section 6(r), but gave no reason for this conclusion, although 
it on its face contradicts the Court's earlier description of the property 
as "machinery, materials and supplies." (emphasis supplied).• It then 
conceded that at least some of the items are "machinery'' under Sec-
tion 6(s), but stated that the taxpayers do not" 'directly' furnish power 
to manufacturers or hot water or steam to either manufacturers or con-
sumers. "7 This flat statement is presumably meant to dispose of any 
contention that the machinery at issue is covered by the exempti.on for 
machinery used "in the furnishing of gas, water, steam or electricity 
when delivered to consumers through mains, lines or pipes." But the 
contention, is not disposed of by the Court's statement, which is misdi-
rected. The statute does not require the taxpayer to furnish anything 
directly; it requires that the machinery in question do so, and it is 
difficult to imagine anything more directly involved in the furnishing of 
water and steam than the boilers installed by the taxpayers. Of course, 
it is possible that the taxpayers did not install boilers which furnished 
steam or hot water "to consumers through mains, lines or pipes," but 
the Court makes no inquiry into this point. 
S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v. State Tax Commission8 involved a sales 
tax exemption claimed by a construction contractor for machinery and 
equipment used in building a tunnel and water pipe for the Metropoli-
tan District Commission over a three-year period. The Court, citing Ace 
Heating, disposed of the taxpayer's claim under Section 6(r) and (s) on 
the ground that "those exemptions do not apply to sales to contractors 
who do not furnish water to anyone."• This statement continues the 
misconception of the statute contained in Ace Heating; the statute does 
not focus on the taxpayer but on the use to which his equipment is put. 
The taxpayer in Groves also relied on Section 6(f), which exempts 
sales of "building materials and supplies to be used in the construction 
... of (1) any building, structure, public highway, bridge or other 
public works . . . . " 10 The issue was whether the equipment in question 
1 I d. at 2493, 356 N .E.2d at 700. 
• Id. at 2492, 356 N.E.2d at 700. 
7 Id., citing AsseBSors of Holyoke v. State Tax Comm'n, 355 MaBS. 223, 243-244, 244 
N.E.2d 287, 299-300 (1969). 
8 1977 MaBS. Adv. Sh. 451, 360 N.E.2d 895. 
• Id. at 457, 360 N.E.2d at 899. 
"Id. at 455, 360 N.E.2d at 899. 17
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constituted "building materials and supplies," which is defined by the 
statute as including "all materials and supplies consumed, employed or 
expended in the construction . . . of any . . . public work, as well as 
such materials and supplies physically incorporated therein." 11 The 
Court concluded that equipment, tools and machinery not physically 
incorporated in the project were not "building materials and supplies" 
for three reasons. First, the definition of the term specifically included 
rental charges for "construction vehicles, equipment a1;1d machinery" 
rented specifically for use on the site, thus suggesting that sales of such 
items may not be exempt. 12 The separation of "materials, tools and fuel" 
from "machinery" in Section 6(r) and (s) likewise suggests that machin-
ery is not to be considered materials.t3 Finally, the "ordinary usage of 
words" indicates that the term "materials and supplies" does not in-
clude equipment, tools and machinery .•• The Court admitted that its 
result required the general public to "bear the ultimate burden in an 
amount greater than the amount of the tax," but stated that this objec-
tion should be directed to the legislature. 15 
The final issue in the Groves case was the taxability of labor charges 
on various invoices, primarily for repairing materials and supplies. The 
Court held that charges for repairs made after a sale are not subject to 
tax, at least where separately stated, noting that the statutory exclusion 
of certain labor charges from tax•• should not be taken as implying that 
all other labor charges are subject to tax. 17 
New England Truck Leasing Corp. v. State Tax Commission 18 raised 
the question of whether a corporation which supplied school buses to 
several towns was providing transportation services or was merely leas-
ing the buses. If the transaction was a contract for services, the sup-
plier's leasing of the buses from a related corporation was subject to the 
sales tax; if the transaction was a lease, the supplier's leasing of the 
buses from the related corporation was exempt as a purchase for resale.t• 
The Appellate Tax Board held that the contracts with the towns were 
for transportation services, pointing out that the supplier provided driv-
ers, operated and maintained the buses, and that the school committees 
II G.L. c. 64H, § 6(0. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 456, 360 N.E.2d at 899. 
II fd. 
14 Id. 
11 Jd. at 457, 360 N.E.2d at 899. 
11 G.L. c. 64H, § 1(14)(c)(iii) excludes from the "sales price" the a~ount charged for 
labor or services rendered in installing or applying the property sold. Section 1(14)(c)(v) 
excludes transportation charges if the transportation occurs after the sale of the property. 
17 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 455, 360 N.E.2d at 898. 
11 Docket No. 75690, (Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in 2 MASS. TAX CAS. (CCH) ~ 200-478. 
II G.L. c. 64H, § 1(13). 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1977 [2012], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1977/iss1/11
§8.13 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 157 
of the towns could designate the routes and time schedules of the 
buses. 20 
The lessor corporation apparently argued also that even if the con-
tract between the supplier and the towns was for transportation services, 
it could avoid sales tax by claiming the benefit of the exempt purchaser 
certificates which the towns had given the supplier.21 This argument was 
only briefly and somewhat obliquely dealt with by the Board, which 
held that even assuming an entity in the position of the lessor corpora-
tion could under some circumstances claim the protection of an exempt 
purchaser certificate given to another entity, the lessor corporation had 
not satisfied its burden of proof. 22 
Baker Transport, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 23 unlike the cases 
discussed above, did not involve the taxability of a given transaction but 
rather who should bear the tax on the leasing of tractors and trailers to 
a supermarket chain. The lessors made the ingenious argument that 
G.L. c. 64H, § 3(c), which provides that the purchaser must pay the 
sales tax on the sale at retail of motor vehicles to the registrar of motor 
vehicles and which defines a sale to include a lease and a purchaser to 
include a lessee, 24 required the lessees to pay the tax. The Supreme 
Judicial Court rejected this argument observing that it clearly was at 
odds with the legislative intent as revealed by the entire statutory 
scheme, that is to insure payment of the tax upon any change of owner-
ship of a motor vehicle.26 The Court dealt with the dilemma posed by 
the definitions of "purchaser" and "sale at retail" in a footnote at the 
end of the opinion, in which the Court stated that the definitions did 
not require the result urged by the lessors because the definitions were 
made applicable unless "the context indicates otherwise."28 The Court 
then took the unusual step, for a court not noted for liberally construing 
statutes, of adding that even if the statute had not contained such a 
proviso its decision would have been the same because of its "duty . . . 
to ascertain and carry out the intent of the Legislature."27 
§8.13. Corporation Excise Tax: Legislative Developments. The 
only substantive change in the corporation excise tax was an act de-
signed to encourage the use of alternative energy sources.• It provides 
20 2 MASs. TAX. CAs. (CCH) at 10,430-31. 
•• G.L. c. 64H, § 6(0 provides that certain tax-exe.mpt institutions may receive certifi-
cates from the commissioner entitling vendors to sell to them tax free. 
zz 2 MAss. TAx. CAS. (CCH) at 10,431. 
zz 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 259, 360 N.E.2d 860 . 
.. G.L. c. 64H, § 1(12)(a), § 1(8). 
25 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 263-64, 360 N.E.2d at 862. 
20 Id. at 266, n.ll, 360 N.E.2d at 863 n.ll. 
27 ld. at 266, 360 N.E.2d at 863. 
§8.13 1 Acts of 1976, c. 487, § 1. 
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that at the election of a business corporation and subject to several 
enumerated conditions, the income measure of the excil1e may be re-
duced for expenses paid for installing any solar or wind powered climate 
control or water heating unit. In addition, the tangible property measure 
of the excise shall not include such a unit. 
In connection with the corporation excise tax a change in the proce-
dure for adjustment of the Massachusetts excise tax, after a final deter-
mination of the federal tax is particularly worth noting. Previously, a 
corporation had one year from the final determination of its federal tax 
to report and pay any resulting increase in Massachusetts tax; that 
period has now been reduced to three months. 2 If no report is filed by 
the corporation, the commissioner now has two years rather than three 
from the receipt of notice from the federal government of the change in 
federal tax to assess any additional excise tax. 3 ln addition, the law now 
specifies that any such assessment shall be limited to changes in tax 
resulting from the change in the federal tax liability; 4 the previous law 
was silent on this point. If the change in the federal tax results in a lower 
Massachusetts excise, the corporation may apply for an abatement 
within one year of the determination of the federal tax, but the state tax 
commission is not limited in its consideration of the application to items 
related to the change in federal tax. 5 
§8.14. Practice and Procedure on Appeal: Judicial Develop· 
ments: Declaratory Actions. In Sydney-v. Commissioner of Corpora-
tions & Taxation, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the principles 
that govern whether a declaratory action should be permitted in a tax 
case if administrative remedies have not been exhausted. In Sydney the 
developers of an urban redevelopment project under G.L. c. 121A 
brought a declaratory action to determine whether the excise tax in the 
year of completion of a project under section 10 of ch!lpter 121A could 
be based on the completed "fair cash value of the project," even though 
the project was not completed on January 1 of that year, and whether a 
"maximum fair cash value" determined by the local assessors under 
paragraph 7 of section 10 could be ignored by the assessors in determin-
ing the fair cash value of the project under paragraph 3 of section 10.2 
A superior court judge had dismissed the complaint presumably be-
cause of the availability of administrative remedies, giving no indication 




§8.14 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2538, 356 N.E.2d 460. 
1 /d. at 2540-41, 356 N.E.2d 461-62. 
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that he was exercising his discretion. 3 The Court reversed this dismissal 
and remanded the case for a discretionary determination of whether the 
action should be entertained, emphasizing that a declaratory action in 
the tax area may not be automatically dismissed because administrative 
remedies have not been exhausted. Without suggesting any 
"comprehensive guidelines" for the exercise of the trial judge's discre-
tion, the Court observed that a declaratory action was inappropriate 
unless the administrative remedy was "seriously inadequate, " but that 
it is favored where the issue is important and of wide impact or where 
the question at issue is one of law and there is no dispute as to the facts.• 
The Court gave no indication of how the superior court judge should 
exercise his discretion on remand, intimating that further pleadings 
would be called for before a decision could be made.1 
Unlike the decision in Sidney, the decision in S.J. Groves & Sons Co. 
v. State Tax Commission• gives some idea of the permissible range of a 
trial judge's discretion in determining whether to allow a declaratory 
action to proceed if administrative remedies have not been exhausted. 
In Groves a construction contractor claimed a sales tax exemption for 
various materials used in connection with a public works project. • The 
Superior Court judge took jurisdiction of the case, and the Supreme 
Judicial Court on appeal upheld this exercise of his discretion, pointing 
out that there was no argument as to the facts and that the legal issue 
was one of first impression which might affect persons other than the 
taxpayer.7 However, the Court acknowledged that the decision was a 
close one and that "we would probably have left it to the Appellate Tax 
Board."8 
1 Id. at 2538, 356 N.E.2d at 460. 
• ld. at 2542-44, 356 N.E.2d at 463-64. 
1 /d. at 2545, 356 N .E.2d 464. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 451, 360 N.E.2d 895. 
7 Id. at 453-54, 360 N.E.2d at 898. 
• ld. at 454, 360 N.E.2d at 898. 
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